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Summary
Introduction. Adverse events pose a challenge to medical man-
agement: they can produce mild or transient disabilities or lead 
to permanent disabilities or even death; preventable adverse 
events result from error or equipment failure. 
Methods. IRCCS Istituto Ortopedico Galeazzi implemented a 
clinical risk management program in order to study the epi-
demiology of adverse events and to improve new pathways for 
Introduction
clinical risk management (crM) has become an im-
portant part of hospital management. reducing the 
probability of risk in hospitals is vital for improving 
health care quality, hospital staff-patient relation-
ships, patient compliance and for limiting malpractice 
litigation. crM is based on a systematic methodology 
designed to identify, analyse, evaluate, communicate, 
eliminate and monitor risks associated with hospital 
procedures, processes, and clinical or administrative 
guidelines. risks are usually associated with diagnostic 
and therapeutic procedures performed in hospitals [1]: 
the objective of crM is to decrease the probability of 
adverse events with a an unexpected and (or) poten-
tially harmful effect on a patient’s health status [2]. 
Preventing medical error has been targeted by public 
health strategies [3-7]; moreover, nationwide studies 
and campaigns have been conducted to raise awareness 
among hospital staff about different kinds of errors. er-
ror classification can be based on different approaches 
to analyzing the origin of an error. rasmussen [8] 
classified errors by taking human behaviour as their 
source, while Reason [8-12] defined errors as actions 
deviant from planned ones, showing the importance 
of latent errors. responsible for the discovery and 
control of latent errors are health care managers and 
clinical directors, who often are unaware of these prob-
lems [13]. the role of hospital staff and its efforts to 
reduce errors are therefore crucial [10]. enlisting the 
help of staff in risk awareness campaigns can ensure 
a campaign will be successful. the involvement of all 
staff is an essential element of hospital crM programs 
since it allows the spread of risk awareness across all 
levels of an organization’s hierarchy and forms a basis 
for implementing programs to control the occurrence 
of accidents or close calls during daily activities. the 
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preventing clinical errors: a risk management FMECA-FMEA 
pro-active analysis was applied either to an existing clinical sup-
port pathway or to a new process before its implementation. 
Results. The application of FMEA-FMECA allowed the clinical 
risk unit of our hospital to undertake corrective actions in order to 
reduce the adverse events and errors on high-risk procedure used 
inside the hospitals.
involvement of hospital staff should be organized to 
report errors, both evident and latent [14-16]. report-
ing should be neither anonymous nor punitive, except 
for evident failure to comply with mandatory or recom-
mended procedures. incident reporting will include the 
frequency, severity, site and possible source of error in 
the organization model. However, reporting, registra-
tion and interpretation of errors are not sufficient alone 
to improve quality of care. the hospital staff need to be 
involved in preventing errors, recognizing the source of 
mistakes or failures of the organization and procedures. 
risk analysis methods may be classified as reactive or 
proactive. reactive methods are based on the analysis 
of reported adverse events through the use of incident 
reporting, administrative data, comparison with es-
tablished quality indicators, and root cause analysis: 
when an adverse event occurs, a specific and accurate 
analysis of the steps leading to the failed procedure is 
performed. reactive methods are adopted by hospital 
management to show the number and severity of errors 
and to modify procedures and organization. But direct 
staff involvement is no less important for enhancing 
risk awareness in risk culture – and it is for this purpose 
that proactive methods can be used.
A proactive analysis can be performed with failure 
Mode and effects criticality Analysis (fMecA) meth-
odology [17, 18]. Because it focuses on both process 
and product, fMecA permits evaluation of health 
system quality. the fMecA-based risk management 
approach is defined as a “bottom-up” process because, 
starting from a particular point (e.g. ordinary process 
activities, single components of a product), it locates 
defects or faults within a system.
the essential advantage of pro-active risk analysis meth-
ods is that they are used before errors or accidents occur. 
Preventive action, by analysing a process to locate a haz-
ard, is by far the more effective way to improve health 
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care worker safety. Moreover, fMecA actively involves 
staff, since the operators of a department in question 
analyse, evaluate and quantify the risk in each step of the 
procedures they apply in daily clinical practice [15].
fMecA was chosen by the Joint commission Ac-
creditation of Healthcare organizations (JcAHo) as the 
standard method for risk evaluation (Standard LD 5.2 
Accreditation Manual, 2001 Edition).
Methods
the awareness that the human factor cannot be com-
pletely eliminated from the occurrence of adverse 
events and that enabling the operator to minimize the 
chance of committing an error is a fundamental duty 
of an organization for correct risk management. At the 
irccS Galeazzi, Milan, a risk management fMecA-
fMeA pro-active analysis (fig. 1) was applied to sev-
eral pathways of the quality system.
this methodology was applied to an existing clinical 
support pathway and to a new process before it was 
implemented. All execution errors of the analysed 
processes had been preventively considered; this made 
it possible to introduce tests, controls, and countermea-
sures to limit errors.
Step 1: Selection of the proceSS for analySiS
the institute identified the processes it defined as criti-
cal based on the severity of potential harmful events 
and the potentially dangerous outcomes for patient 
safety. We will consider the analysis of the blood and 
hemoderivatives supply and dosing procedure (an ex-
isting procedure) and of the physical retention usage in 
accidental drops prevention pathway (a new pathway). 
the former was examined and modified also because 
of the occurrence of a potentially fatal event at the in-
stitute; the latter, which pertains mainly to orthopedic 
services or units with patients with locomotor appa-
ratus illnesses, identified all potential causes of error 
or harm to patients before it was implemented by the 
Quality System.
Step 2: aSSembly of the fmea team
for proper application of the methodology, the assembly 
of a team of experts to analyse the process and identify 
the potential critical sources of errors was fundamental. 
the pathways were analysed by blood bank service per-
sons in charge of servicing orders for blood products and 
by head nurses of the hospital’s orthopedic and rehabilita-
tion departments for the physical retention pathway.
Step 3: analySiS of the Selected proceSS
the processes were broken down into subprocesses and 
simple tasks. the processes were described in terms of 
what actually happens in daily practice and not what 
should happen. flow charts for both procedures were 
drafted to simplify the process analysis.
Step 4: identification of potential drawbackS and 
breakdownS
the teams identified in each subprocess and simple task 
the potential drawbacks, i.e. the potential risks, that, 
should they occur, could be harmful for patient safety. 
this analysis needs to show all potential failures of a 
procedure (tab. i).
Step 5: identification of potential conSequenceS
After the error modes were identified, the consequences 
of each were evaluated. this step is fundamental for 
evaluating all potential consequences, from the slightest 
to the most serious.
Step 6: identification of potential cauSeS
each drawback was associated with one or more potential 
causes.
Step 7: evaluation of Severity, probability of 
occurrence and detectability of each cauSe
the team evaluated for each pathway subprocess the 
severity, probability of occurrence and detectability of 
each drawback/error found in the previous steps.
Severity is defined as the damage or injury a patient 
may sustain from occurrence of the potential drawback; 
probability is the possibility or the frequency with 
which a drawback will occur; detectability refers to the 
possibility of the operators and the control measures 
to track a drawback/error. the scale to evaluate sever-
ity, probability, and detectability was taken from Spath 
(tab. ii).
Fig. 1. the FMeA process covers the following steps. (Modified 
from spath, AorN J 2003).
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Step 8: evaluation of the criticality index
After these three characteristics are taken for each po-
tential injury, each was assigned a risk priority number 
(rPn) calculated with the formula rPn = severity X 
probability X detectability.
Measured against this scale, the criticality index has 
a range from 1 to 1000. By calculating the rPn the 
team identified those pathways and processes that 
required corrective actions to reduce problems within 
the system.
Tab. I. example of application of FMeCA to the Blood and Hemo-derived demand and dosing Procedure.
Major activity:
Main activity Kind of error Causes of error S* P° D# RPN§ Action S P D RPN
Assessment 
of patient
ability to 
receive blood
transfusion
error in assessment
of patient ability to
receive blood
transfusion
Failure to folllow 
the procedure
 (pathway) 8 10 10 800
Make sure the procedure
is followed and it is
clearly stated in the
clinical notes
8 2 10 160
Blood 
Pressure
measurement
error in blood
pressure
measurement
Failure to folllow 
the procedure 
(pathway)
8 10 10 800
Make sure the procedure
is followed and it is
clearly stated in the
clinical notes
8 1 10 80
Body 
temperature
assessment
error in body
temperature
assessment
Failure to folllow 
the procedure 
(pathway) 8 10 10 800
Make sure the procedure
is followed and it is
clearly stated in the
clinical notes
8 1 10 80
* severity; ° Probability; # detectability; § risk Priority Number
Tab. II. FMeCA occurrence, severity and detection ranking (modified from spath, AorN J 2003;78:16-37).
Ranking
Probability (P)
remote (No known occurrence) 1
low (Possible but no known data eg. may happen sometime in 5 to 30 
years)
2-4
Moderate (documented but infrequent) 5-6
High (documented and frequent) 7-8
very high (documented, almost certain error eg. may happen several times 
in 1 year)
9-10
Severity (S)
slight annoyance. (No injury nor increased length of stay nor increased level 
of care)
1
Moderate system problem 2-3
Major system problem 4-5
Minor injury 6
Major injury increased length of stay or increased level of care 7
terminal injury (e.g. permanent loss of function) 8-9
death 10
Detectability (D)
very high (system will always detect error) 1
High (error likely to be detected before product reaches patient) 2-3
Moderate (Moderate likelihood of detection before error reaches patient) 4-6
low (low likelihood that error will be detected before product/service 
reaches patient)
7-8
remote 9
None (detection not possible at any point within system) 10
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Fig. 2a. rPN for the Blood and Hemo-derived demand and dosing Procedure, before the application of FMeCA-FMeA analysis.
Fig. 2b. rPN for the Blood and Hemo-derived demand and dosing Procedure, after the application of FMeCA-FMeA analysis.
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Legend to Figures 2a and 2b.
the blood and hemoderivatives supply and dosing procedures were broken down into subprocesses and simple tasks (FMeA-
FMeCA pro-active analysis): here we show those pathways and processes that required corrective actions to reduce problems 
within the system and the patients. 
Step 1 Data to be included in the buffy-coat request form
1.6 on the buffy-coat request form the medical doctor has to clearly report  the degree of urgency. specifically, it has to 
be indicated whether the buffy-coat: 1) is scheduled for a specific date; 2) Has to be available for a period of 48 h during 
and after the surgical procedure; 3) is urgent.
step 2 Blood sample collection
2.1  verify the identy of the patient undergoing the blood sample collection.
2.2 Collect the blood sample during the two hours preceding the scheduled time of the of the buffy coat request.
step 3 On buffy-coat receival   
3.3 Fill the form for the assignment of the buffy coat to a given patient, providing all the required information, such as 
patient and operator id (identity) and starting time of the procedure.
3.4 the filled form has to be delivered immediately to the blood bank  and has to specifically report the  starting and end-
ing time of the transfusion.
3.5 At the end of the procedure, the operator has to sign the blood bank register. this represent an additional checking 
point that allows the identification of the operator, in case of an error occurs.
Step 4 Additional controls to prevent errors in blood transfusion to patients  
4.4 report on the patient’s medical record  the buffy coat identification code.
Step 5 Blood transfusion unit preparation
5.1 it is enforced not to add solutions or drugs to the buffy coat during the preparation phase.
5.3 thawing the plasma fraction in water bath at 37°C  in order to avoid damage to the transfusion bag.
5.4 Use specific shielded catheters to avoid clot formation.
Step 6 Patient preparation to the transfusion
6.1 verify the eligibility of the patient for blood transfusion by checking blood pressure and temperature.
Assuring that the patient has observed the appropriate fasting regimen before the transfusion.
6.2 Checking blood pressure.
6.3 Checking temperature.
6.4 Assuring that the patient has observed the appropriate fasting regimen before the transfusion.
Step 7 Provide assistance to the patient during transfusion
7.2 Check the patient vital parameters and report them on the medical record.
Step 8 End of the transfusion
8.2 Check the vital parameters of the patients and report them on the medical record.
8.3 report the ending time of the transfusion.
Step 9 Procedure to adopt in case of variation of the vital parameters during  the transfusion
9.3 Collect blood sample from the patient soon after variation of the parameters had occurred.
9.4 Collect urine sample from the patient soon after variation of the parameters had occurred.
9.6 Collect blood, urine and fecal samples a few hours after the adverse reaction, to ascertain the absence of a hemolytic 
reaction.
Step 9: definition and application of improvement 
meaSureS
improvement measures were identified according to the 
subprocesses with the highest rPn.
Step 10: evaluation of intervention effectiveneSS
After the corrective actions were undertaken, the team 
recalculated the rPn of the subprocesses and found a 
decrease in the criticality index. for both procedures 
an “ad hoc” control system was instituted to identify 
all accidents or near-accidents related to the analysed 
procedures.
active control of adverSe eventS
for a complete evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
corrective actions, the team set up an active control 
system that involved the entire staff: any health care 
worker involved in an adverse event is to report it to the 
administration so that an investigation can be carried 
out to identify the cause, mode of error and possible 
changes needed for preventing its recurrence. to ensure 
complete investigation of an adverse event, the admin-
istration implemented a nonpunitive reporting system so 
that all necessary data can be obtained from the health 
care worker involved. in this way, all adverse events or 
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near-miss events arising from an operator’s procedural 
error can be identified.
Results
At present, because of its experimental design, the study 
results are still preliminary. it was seen, however, that 
application of the fMeA/fMecA methodology to the 
existing blood supply and management protocol helped 
to modify the procedure by adding further control sys-
tems to minimize the possibility of a transfusion reac-
tion from incompatbile ABo. As illustrated in figures 
2a and 2b, the difference in the estimated risk index 
before and after modifications indicated a significant 
decrease in the likelihood of injury to patients.
final results await evaluation after continued applica-
tion of the planned procedures together with application 
of those analyzed. the institute involved the entire staff 
in the active control of identified sentinel events.
Discussion
Application of fMecA to the pathway of patient control 
by means of constraint tools showed that the methodology 
was highly specific. the wide differences in the rPn of 
the same evaluated steps of the procedure between two 
different rehabilitation departments were related to dif-
ferent approaches and different evaluation by different 
teams. After receiving specific training and information, 
nurses and rehabilitation therapists found it easy to cal-
culate the rPn and to accept and carry out the fMecA. 
the characteristics of the rehabilitation patients were very 
similar because they are transferred from the orthopedic 
departments after hip or knee replacement or surgery for 
bone fracture. there are no comparative studies on fMe-
cA application in different wards of the same hospital or 
between similar wards of different hospitals.
the application of fMecA to a well-established pro-
cedure, such as blood transfusion orders, showed a dra-
matic effect of changes on high-risk steps as measured 
by rPn. the methodology could play a specific role 
in the revision and reinterpretation of clinical practice 
protocols. it should be underlined that blood transfu-
sion order protocols are regulated by national laws and 
norms. the possible deviant behaviour of physicians 
and nurses are minimized. the changes we made to the 
old pathway introduced some additional controls on 
steps that significantly decreased the rPn. the use of 
fMecA should also be considered for evaluating the 
effectiveness of mandatory procedures to be used in dif-
ferent hospitals or in different health care facilities.
Conclusions
the clinical risk unit of our hospital generated a greater in-
terest of health care workers in risk management, most likely 
because the reporting system was nonpunitive and because 
staff were directly involved with the team of experts in 
applying the fMeA/fMecA methodology. through staff 
interest and involvement, valuable epidemiological data on 
new hazards within the facility have been obtained so that 
the administration, by central analysis (eg. fMecA), can 
institute recommended best practices and new pathways for 
staff to follow in order to monitor progress in the prevention 
of error and to improve patient safety.
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